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PROCEED AT YOUR OWN RISK: 
THE BALANCE BETWEEN ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
John E. Matejkovic* and David A. Redle** 
Institutions of higher education are conducted for the common good 
and not to further the interest of either the individual teacher or the 
institution as a whole. The common good depends upon the free search 
for truth and its free exposition. 1 
l. INTRODUCTION 
Sex is a central part of human existence and as such is an appropriate 
subject for academic consideration and discussion. In many school 
districts, sex education classes begin in the latter years of elementary 
school, and almost every high school includes some sex education, even 
if only as a part of a general "health" class. Sex is an appropriate topic of 
discussion in anthropology classes, sociology classes, and civics or 
current events classes at the high school level. Similarly, sex is an 
appropriate topic at the college level not only in anthropology and 
sociology classes, but also in English composition classes and classes 
dealing with human relations issues generally. Sex is an especially 
appropriate topic in colleges of business when discussing a business's 
human relations function or in business law classes reviewing equal 
employment opportunity law. 
Despite its appropriateness for discussion in an academic context, 
sex can also be a difficult or contentious subject. Many schools have 
adopted policies and guidelines related to sexual harassment and 
professional behavior in and out of the classroom. Society is generally 
very sensitive to issues of sexual abuse and harassment, and this often 
*Assistant Professor of Business Law, College of Business Administration, The University of 
Akron, Akron, OH; J.D., The University of Akron, 1979. 
**Professor of Business Law, College of Business Administration, The University of Akron, OH; 
J.D., The University of Akron, 1980; M.B.A., The University of Akron. 
I. Am. Assn. of U. Profs., /940 Statement ofPrinciples on Academic Freedom and Tenure, 
http://www.aaup.org/statements/Redbook/1940stat.htm ( 1940). 
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makes any academic discussion of sex-related issues a delicate matter. 
Indeed, awareness of sexual harassment is increasing, 2 as evidenced by 
over 13,000 annual filings of sexual harassment claims since 1994 with 
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and 
corresponding state fair employment practice agencies. 3 
While a discussion of sex-related issues may be an academic 
necessity in some situations, instructors need to be aware that there is a 
very fine line that may exist between a legitimate classroom discussion 
and an offensive one. Of particular concern, especially in the current 
climate of academia, is the fact that what an instructor believes may be a 
legitimate classroom discussion may result in his or her loss of 
employment with very little recourse. Sexual harassment especially 
becomes a concern in the educational context when principles of sexual 
harassment conflict with concepts of academic freedom. 
As discussions of sex are often difficult and/or sensitive, two 
germane questions arise: (1) When does classroom conduct or discussion 
rise to the level of sexual harassment? (2) At what point is classroom 
conduct or discussion protected under the rubric of academic freedom? 
These are the issues and concerns discussed in this article. 
This article begins in Part II with an analysis of the concept of 
academic freedom recognizing that, despite its evolution, academic 
freedom continues to be a concept that is somewhat vague and 
undefined. The authors suggest that, at a minimum, academic freedom 
includes the freedom to investigate and research topics without regard to 
current atmospheres of political correctness or controversy, the ability to 
engage in classroom behavior to convey information in a manner which 
is professionally appropriate to the subject matter taught, and the ability 
to discuss relevant, controversial issues in the classroom. In Part III of 
this article we analyze sexual harassment and the legal protections 
afforded in an academic context. This concept is considered from two 
perspectives: (I) Title IX protections against a hostile work environment 
or quid pro quo harassment; and (2) other tort protections related to 
sexual harassment, such as negligent hire and negligent supervision. The 
focus of Part IV examines the collision between the collision between the 
concept of a hostile work environment and other tort protections related 
to sexual harassment. Generally Parts III and IV offer a survey of the 
2. While this paper focuses on sexual harassment, it is important to remember that unlawful 
harassment can be found to occur on the basis of any legally protected classification (e.g., race, 
religion, age, disability). 
3. U.S. Equal Empl. Opportunity Commn., Sexual llarassment Charges EEOC & FEPAs 
Combined: FY 1992 -FY 2004 (available at http://www.ceoc.gov/stats/harass.html) (last modified 
Jan. 27, 2005 ). 
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important case law in these areas. The authors conclude that educators 
and educational institutions should be cautioned to proceed at their own 
risk when utilizing sex and related subjects in the classroom. 
II. ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
While the phrase "academic freedom" has been used in many court 
decisions, it remains a rather vague, undefined concept. 4 Academic 
freedom has evolved over time based upon application of constitutional 
protections to students, faculty, and administrators of educational 
institutions. 
From the faculty or administrative perspective, this amorphous 
concept of academic freedom evolved along with concepts of tenure or 
under collective-bargaining agreements. While tenure does not provide 
complete protection to faculty members for any activities in which they 
might engage, it allows academics freedom to engage in a wide range of 
intellectual activities, as tenure statutes usually guarantee employment 
except in cases of incompetence, neglect of duty, immorality, 
unsatisfactory performance, insubordination, or conviction of a felony, 
drunkenness, or criminal behavior. 5 While currently they seem clearly 
unconstitutional as a violation of First Amendment rights, many states 
had laws banning teachers who were members of the Communist Party, 
advocated communism, or refused to sign oaths of loyalty. 6 Though 
many may argue that tenure can be a mixed blessing, it is clear that freed 
from concerns about "unjust" terminations, faculty members are able to 
engage in broader areas of academic pursuit as well as exercise of their 
First Amendment freedoms of speech and association. 7 
Although faculty may enjoy more liberties and independence in their 
academic pursuits as a result of the development of academic freedom, 
there is a dearth of cases and treatises attempting to provide a single, 
4. This paper is not designed to provide a comprehensive discussion of the evolution or 
parameters of "academic freedom." Readers interested in the history, evolution, or vagueness of 
"academic freedom" arc directed to any number of other articles discussing the concept in more 
detail, such as /Jcvclopnu!nls in the raw: Academic Freedom, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1048 (1968); Charles 
Alan Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22 Vand. L. Rev. I 027 (I 969); J. Peter Byrne, 
Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of" the Firs/ Amendment," 99 Yale L.J. 25 I ( 1989); and 
others. 
5. 5}ee CaL Educ. Code Ann.~ 44932(a)(l)-(a)(ll) (2006); Colo. Rev. Stat. §22-63-301 
(2005 ); Conn. Gen. Stat. ~I 0-151 (2004); Fla. Stat. ~ 231.36(3) (repealed 2003); Ohio Rev. Code 
Ann.§ 3319.16 (Anderson 2006); S.C. Code Ann.~ 59-25-430 (2005) (also listing drunkenness and 
use, sale, or possession of drugs). 
6. CaL Educ. Code Ann. at§ 44932(a)(9), (a)( I 0). 
7. Obviously. the First Amendment freedoms involved are only protected against state 
action; a private school teacher might not find such protections available. 
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clear, and universally accepted definition of academic freedom. 
However, the concept of academic freedom is never clearly defined in 
any particular court decision. It is often cited as a concept or a concern in 
a particular case, but the United States Supreme Court has never clearly 
defined what academic freedom is, nor who it protects. 
It would seem that the concept of academic freedom exists to 
promote broad latitude in not only the topics or subjects that should be 
taught or considered in an academic setting, but also to provide wide 
latitude in how those topics or subjects may be taught. As one 
commentator notes, "Lacking definition or guiding principle, the doctrine 
[of academic freedom] floats in the law, picking up decisions as a hull 
does bamacles."8 As another commentator asks, "To whom does 
[academic freedom] belong?"9 Many legal analysts agree that academic 
freedom should guarantee First Amendment rights of freedom of 
expression to the extent the exercise of those rights is consistent with the 
normal activities of a university. Some commentators note that 
recognized limitations such as "time and place" regulations may be 
appropriate and permissible on the campus to ensure order, avoid 
fl o 10 con 1ct, etc. 
The authors of this article recognize the absence of support for a 
universally accepted definition of academic freedom. For the purposes of 
this paper, the authors define academic freedom to include the freedom 
to investigate and research topics without regard to current atmospheres 
of political correctness or controversy, the ability to engage in classroom 
behavior to convey information in a manner which is professionally 
appropriate to the subject matter taught, and the ability to discuss 
relevant, controversial issues in the classroom. 
The concept of academic freedom was generally recognized by the 
United States Supreme Court as early as 1957, in Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire. 11 Sweezy involved an investigation of a professor by the 
New Hampshire Attorney General, pursuant to the state's Subversive 
Activities Act. 12 During the course of the investigation, Sweezy refused 
to answer certain questions posed by the Attorney General, and was cited 
for contempt. 13 The contempt citation was upheld by the lower courts 
8. Byrne, supra n. 4, at 253. 
9. Julius G. Getman & Jacqueline W. Mintz, Foreword: Academic Freedom in a Changing 
Society, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 1247, 1249 (1988). 
I 0. E.g. Wright, supra n. 4, at I 041-46 ("I do not read the first amendment as granting rights 
in a vacuum, but rather as granting rights that exist at a particular time and place."). 
II. 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
12. !d. at 236-38. 
13. !d. at 244. 
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but reversed by the Supreme Court, which held that the process involved 
in the investigation violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because it infringed Sweezy's First Amendment rights. 14 In 
oft-quoted language, the Court stated: 
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities 
is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a 
democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To 
impose any strait-jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges 
and universities would imperil the future of our Nation .... Teachers 
and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to 
evaluate, to gain new maturit~ and understanding; otherwise our 
civilization will stagnate and die. 5 
Following the Court's general recognition of the protections of 
academic freedom, subsequent decisions expanded teachers' 
constitutional rights to engage in "outside" political activity in the mid-
1960s, in cases such as Johnson v. Branch, 16 Racklev v. School 
District, 17 and Williams v. Sumter School District. Us The most 
significant ruling in this regard was that of the United States Supreme 
Court in Keyishian v. Board of Regents 19 in which the First Amendment 
right of freedom of association was applied to teachers who belonged to 
"subversive" organizations. 20 Specifically mentioning academic freedom 
for the first time, the Court found academic freedom to be a "special 
concern of the First Amendment."21 In fact, the Court noted that 
academic freedom was necessary for the "robust exchange of ideas" 
which should occur in an academic setting. 22 
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, 
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the 
teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special concern of the 
First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of 
orthodoxy over the classroom. "The vigilant protection of constitutional 
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American 
schools." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) .... The 
Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to 
that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth "out of the 
14. !d. at 254-55. 
15. !d. at 250. 
16. 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966). 
17. 258 F. Supp. 676 (D.S.C. 1966). 
18. 255 F. Supp. 397 (D.S.C. 1966). 
19. 385 U.S. 589 ( 1967). 
20. !d. at 591. 
21. !d. at 603. 
22. !d. 
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multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative 
selection." Uniteq
3 
States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 
(S.D.N.Y. 1943). 
Subsequent cases decided by the Supreme Court established that 
academic freedom exists only in relation to the educational context 
involved. For example, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District, 24 school officials suspended a number of high school 
students for wearing black armbands to the school in protest of the U.S. 
involvement in the Vietnam conflict. 25 The lower courts had upheld the 
suspensions on the basis that the school officials acted properly to 
prevent any disturbances in the school and to maintain discipline. 26 The 
Supreme Court reversed, noting that no disturbance actually occurred 
and the wearing of the armbands was "pure speech" protected by the 
First Amendment. 27 The Court noted that neither teachers nor students 
"shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate."28 However, the Court also noted that public schools 
may limit speech to promote educational goals. 29 
Nineteen years later, the Court reminded educators that academic 
freedom exists only in relation to the educational context involved. It 
indicated in another decision that freedom of expression protections are 
not the standard educators and administrators are to apply in the 
dissemination of student expressions in school-sponsored expressive 
activities ( e<f·· a school newspaper). In Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier, 3 a group of high school students challenged their principal's 
decision to pull an article discussing teen pregnancy and the impact of 
divorce from the school newspaper. 31 The principal's justification in 
pulling the article was that what the students discussed "anonymously" in 
the article could be identified. 32 The Court noted that First Amendment 
rights of high school students are not coextensive with the rights of 
adults in other settings. The Court went on to distinguish Tinker by 
noting that the freedom of expression standard in that case is not the 
same standard for determining when a school may lend its name and 
23. !d. 
24. 393 U S. 503 ( 1969). 
25. !d. at 504. 
26. !d. at 504-05. 
27. !d. at 505-06, 514. 
2X. !d. at 506. 
29. /d. at 506-07. 
30. 484 U.S. 260 (1988) 
31. !d. at 263. 
32. !d. 
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resources to the dissemination of student expression. 33 The Court held 
that the First Amendment is not violated when school officials exercise 
editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities, as long as those actions are reasonably 
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. 34 
In a 1994 result analogous to Hazelwood School District, the Second 
Circuit in Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free School District Board of 
Education 35 found no academic freedom protection for a teacher who 
used a film strip showing nude men and women to demonstrate the 
phenomenon of "persistence of vision" to a tenth grade mathematics 
class. 36 The court found that no First Amendment violation occurred, 
relying in part on Hazelwood and noting that high school officials were 
allowed to regulate "legitimate pedagogical concerns" based upon 
consideration of the students' ages and levels of maturity. 37 
When evaluating the Silano decision (i.e., at issue was the effect of 
actions as related to high school students), it is notable that there are 
fewer considerations of age or maturity taken into account in academic 
freedom questions at the college or university level because generally 
any students involved are adults. Many of the decisions involving 
colleges or universities specifically address issues of sexual harassment 
and academic freedom based upon the actions and discussions of 
instructors in the classroom. Most court decisions addressing academic 
freedom concerns hold that academic freedom provides protection only 
when the questioned activities are relevant to the academic circumstance. 
"The principle of academic freedom under the First Amendment serves 
to protect the utterances in question only if they are germane to course 
content as measured by professional teaching standards. "38 However, as 
stated by the Ninth Circuit, "Neither the Supreme Court nor this Circuit 
has determined what scope of First Amendment J)fotection is to be given 
a public college professor's classroom speech.'' 3 
Further, while most academics may believe that academic freedom is 
an individual or personal freedom, a more recent, and very significant, 
federal court of appeals decision held that academic freedom applies only 
to educational institutions, and not to individual instructors. In Urofsky v. 
33. !d. at 272-73. 
34. !d. at 273. 
35. 42 F.3d 719 (2d Cir. 1994) 
36. !d. at 721. 
37. !d. at 722--23. 
38. Bonnell v. /,orenzo, 241 F.3d 800, 804 (6th Cir. 2001 ). 
39. Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College. 92 F.3d 968,971 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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Gilmore,40 six professors employed by various public colleges and 
universities in Virginia challenged the constitutionality of a state statute 
prohibiting any state employee from accessing or downloading sexually 
explicit materials on any computer owned or leased by the state. 41 The 
first challenge by the professors was that the statute was unconstitutional 
as applied to all state employees, which the court handily dismissed. The 
court noted that the speech at issue was being regulated on a narrow 
basis (i.e., the prohibition only applied to use of state computers, and did 
not prohibit state employees from accessing or discussing any material 
using their own computers, on their own time), and the First Amendment 
concerns were outweighed by the state's legitimate interest in workplace 
efficiency and maintaining a workplace free of sexual harassment. 42 
The professors' second challenge was that the statute 
unconstitutionally interfered with their First Amendment right of 
academic freedom, as they would be prohibited from accessing 
information regarding human sexuality that was germane to their 
academic pursuits. 43 In fact, one professor complained that the statute 
effectively censored his web site, which contained information regarding 
studies of sexuality, among other things. 44 
After discussing the evolution of the concept of academic freedom in 
the United States and noting that cases such as Sweezy and Keyishian 
actually did not address academic freedom as a concept applicable to 
individual teachers,45 the court held that more recent Supreme Court 
decisions established that academic freedom meant that educational 
institutions had leeway to determine what was to be taught, and in what 
fashion. The court wrote: 46 
Taking all of the cases together, the best that can be said for Appellees' 
claim that the Constitution protects the academic freedom of an 
individual professor is that teachers were the first public employees to 
be afforded the now-universal protection against dismissal for the 
exercise of First Amendment rights. Nothing in Supreme Court 
jurisprudence suggests that the "right" claimed by Appellees extends 
any further. Rather, since declaring that public employees, including 
teachers, do not forfeit First Amendment rights upon accepting public 
employment, the Court has focused its discussions of academic 
40. 216F.3d401 (4thCir.2000). 
4 I. !d. at 404. 
42. See id. at 406, 409; see also id. at 422 (Luttig, J., concurring). 
43. !d. at 409-10. 
44. !d. at 410 n. 9. 
45. !d. at412-14. 
46. !d. at 414 (citing decisions in Regents o/the U. o/Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 ( 1978) 
and Regents of' the U. o/Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 (I 985)). 
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freedom solely on issues of institutional autonomy. We therefore 
conclude that because the Act does not infringe the constitutional rights 
of public eJllployees in general, it also does not violate the rights of 
professors. 
303 
Overall, academic freedom still remains a vague and ambiguous 
concept that seems to receive recognition by the courts in a variety of 
inconsistent, and often ill-defined, circumstances. While the concept has 
received recognition and ratification from the United States Supreme 
Court, questions still remain as to who is protected by academic freedom. 
Even though there is substantial case law indicating that academic 
freedom applies to individual professors, the Fourth Circuit's decision in 
Urofsky casts some doubt as to whether academic freedom is an 
individual professor's right or a right that extends only to educational 
institutions. Likewise, as previously mentioned, the vagueness of the 
concept of academic freedom, including its lack of a clear definition and 
uncertainty regarding who is entitled to its protections, becomes more 
problematic in connection with sexual harassment concerns. 
III. SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
Generally speaking, the law of sexual harassment arose from Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.48 Initially, courts found that Title 
VII was violated when instances of repeated, unwanted sexual advances, 
derogatory comments, gestures, and similar conduct, were directly 
related to obtaining employment, promotions, raises, etc. 49 This conce8t 
is now more commonly referred to as quid pro quo sexual harassment. 5 
In 1980, the EEOC expanded the definition of sexual harassment 
beyond the quid pro quo form of harassment when it issued guidelines 
setting forth a definition of sexual harassment that included the idea of a 
"hostile working environment": 51 
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other 
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual 
47. !d. at 415 (footnote omitted). 
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). 
49. E.g. Miller v. Bank of America, 600 F.2d 21 I, 213 (9th Cir. 1979) (The court found Title 
VII to have been violated when the plaintiff was fired after refusing her supervisors sexual advances. 
"[R]espondeat superior does apply here, where the action complained of was that of a supervisor 
[who has the authority] to hire, tire, discipline or promote, or at least to participate in or recommend 
such actions .... "); see also Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 70-71 (1986) (clearly 
describing the "quid pro quo" concept). 
50. Eugene Scalia, The Strange Career olQuid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 2 I Harv. J.L. & 
Pub. Policy 307, 308 ( 1998). 
51. 29 C.F.R. § I 604. I I (a) (2005). 
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harassment when[:] 
( 1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a 
term or condition of an individual's employment, 
(2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used 
as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or 
(3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering 
with an individual's work performance ~5 creating an intimidating, 
hostile, or offensive working environment. 
The concept of hostile work environment was recognized and 
enforced by the United States Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. 
Vinson. 53 In 1993, the Court expanded an employer's liability for hostile 
work environment sexual harassment by ruling that no diagnosed 
psychological injury was required to state a claim where the conduct was 
severe and pervasive and would be offensive to a "reasonable woman."54 
A. Title IX 
The prohibition of unlawful discrimination and harassment, whether 
quid pro quo or hostile working environment, is included in the 
protections of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 which 
states that: 
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any edu~~tion program or activity receiving 
federal financial assistance .... 
Under Title IX, an aggrieved individual has a private right of action 
against an offending institution, 56 and it is clear that if any program of an 
institution receives federal funds, the entire institution is subject to the 
provisions of Title IX. 57 
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently recognized the protections 
afforded under Title IX. In 1992, the Court in Franklin v. Gwinett 
County Public Schoo!s 58 reiterated that Title IX provides an individual 
basis for claims of sexual harassment or gender discrimination against 
educational institutions as well as a basis for awarding monetary 
damages. 59 In Franklin, the court considered the protections afforded 
52. !d. 
53. 477 U.S. at 67. 
54. Harris v. ForkliftSvs .. lnc., 510 U.S. 17,23 (1993). 
55. 20 U.S.C. ~ 1681(a) (2000). 
56. Cannon v. U of" Chi, 441 U.S. 677, 717 ( 1979). 
57. Civil Rights Restoration Act oj"I'Ni7, 20 U.S.C. § 1687. 
58. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
59. /d. at 76. 
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under Title IX for a female student who was harassed by a 
60 teacher/coach. The female student reported instances of sexual 
conversations, forced kissing, and even coerced intercourse that occurred 
on school premises. 61 The teacher involved in this harassment ultimately 
resigned, although the school personnel suggested the student not pursue 
the matter. 62 In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the student 
could recover monetary damages under Title IX, 63 and more 
importantly, affirmed the Title IX protections against sexual harassment. 
Generally, enforcement of Title IX protections is assigned to the U.S. 
Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights (OCR), which can 
terminate federal funding for educational institutions found to be in 
violation of the law. 64 In 1997, the OCR disseminated the "Sexual 
Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees, 
Other Students, or Third Parties" (hereinafter the Guidance). 65 The 
Guidance specifically states that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act should 
provide a framework for evaluating sexual harassment claims under Title 
IX, 66 and that Title IX prohibits quid pro quo and hostile environment 
acts. 67 The Guidance also specifically notes that educational institutions 
may be held strictly liable for instances of quid pro quo harassment, 68 
just as courts have imposed strict liability under Title VII for cases of 
quid pro quo sexual harassment. 69 
In hostile environment claims, the Guidance imposes liability on 
educational institutions where an employee of the institution appears to 
be acting on behalf of the institution or is aided in carrying out the 
harassment by hi:= or her position of authority. 70 A constructive notice 
standard applies to other hostile environment claims. 71 
Courts have regularly held that Title IX imposes duties on 
educational institutions to prevent sexual harassment of students in the 
60. !d. at 63. 
61. !d. 
62. !d. at 64. 
63. /d. at 76. 
64. 20 U .S.C. 9 16R2 (2000). 
65. 62 Fed. Reg. 12034(Mar. 13, 1997). 
66. !d. at 12046 n. 2. 
67. !d. 
68. ld at 12039. 
69. E.g. Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 70-71 (clearly describing the "quid pro quo" 
concept); see also Faragher v. City ofBoca Raton, 524 U.S. 775,807-08 (1998) (indicating in dicta 
that affirmative defenses should be allowed for hostile environment cases, but not for quid pro quo 
cases). 
70. 62 Fed. Reg. at 12039 (Mar. 13, 1997). 
71. !d. at 12039-40. 
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same fashion that Title VII imRoses duties on employers to prevent 
sexual harassment of employees. 72 With regard to employee-to-student 
sexual harassment the Su~reme Court in Gebser v. Lago Vista 
Independent School District, 3 held that actual notice of the harassment 
was necessary before an educational institution could be held liable 
under Title IX, with the educational institution demonstrating "deliberate 
indifference" to the situation (i.e., failing to act). 74 The court specifically 
rejected imposing liability on the basis of constructive notice (e.g., "the 
institution should have known"), but further held that discriminatory 
animus was not required. 75 Four justices dissented, noting that sexual 
harassment by a teacher violated a duty the school assumed in return for 
federal financial aid and the teachers had far ~reater authority over 
students than employers had over employees. 7 Thus, the dissenters 
noted, the standard for liability under Title IX should be at least roughly 
the same as that used to impose employer liability under Title VII sexual 
h I . 77 arassment c mms. 
Subsequently, though courts have applied an "actual notice" 
requirement to encompass reports from persons other than the victim of 
the sexual harassment, 78 the "deliberate indifference" standard has 
proven somewhat more problematic. The Gebser decision indicates that 
there must be almost a conscious decision to not remedy the 
harassment, 79 while the Sixth Circuit has noted that "deliberate 
indifference" arises when an educational institution turns a "blind eye" to 
the situation it knew or should have known about, and which does 
nothing to end the harassment. 80 
Despite the vagueness of the "deliberate indifference" requirement, it 
is clear that the courts have little difficulty allowing liability issues to 
proceed to trial under Title IX where there is some form of notice of the 
72. E.g. Oona v. McCaffrey, 143 F.3d 473,477 (9th Cir. 1998) ('Title Vll standards apply to 
hostile environment claims under Title IX."). 
73. 524 U.S. 274 ( 1998). 
74. !d. at 290. 
75. !d. at 289-91. 
76. !d. at 297-99 (Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
77. !d. (Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting). 
78. E.g. Massey v. Akron Ci(v Bd. of Educ., 82 F. Supp. 2d 735, 743-44 (N.D. Ohio 2000) 
("The Court held [in Gebser] that an education institution's liability will depend on a showing of 
actual notice and deliberate indifference."). 
79. 524 U.S. at 290-91. 
80. !d. at 290. Vance v. Spencer County Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 262-63 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(finding that the District responded inadequately to the plaintiffs complaints of harassment); see 
also Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 171 F.3d 607, 609-10 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Kinman v. 
Omaha Pub. Sch. !Jist., 94 F.3d 463,467 (8th Cir. 1996)). 
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harassment, and the institution does little or nothing to remedy it. 81 In 
fact, Chontos v. Rhea'IQ gives authority for the proposition that 
"deliberate indifference" is a question of fact to be determined by a 
jury. 83 In Chontos, there was evidence showing the institution knew of a 
professor's reputation of harassment, but did nothing to rectify the 
.. 
84 I h fh . . d situation. n contrast to t e vagueness o t e notice reqUirements un er 
Title IX, the affirmative defense available under Title VII gives 
employers an incentive to act quickly to address and remedy complaints 
85 
of harassment. 
B. Related Causes o_fAction 
While to this point this article has focused on potential sexual 
harassment liability under Title IX, educators should also be aware of 
other bases for liability. In addition to the claims already considered, 
victims of sexual harassment in an academic setting have been successful 
in making tort-based claims against an educational institution based upon 
theories of negligent supervision, negligent hiring, etc. 86 Unsurprisingly, 
the courts have not imposed tort-based liability on institutions where 
there has been no notice of sexual harassment or any evidence in the 
employee's 
8
;ast that would indicate proclivities towards sexual 
harassment. 
To avoid the barriers of Title IX, or to increase the possibilities of 
recovery, several cases impose liability pursuant to the Civil Rights Act 
of 1871, 42 U .S.C. § 1983 (hereinafter "Section 1983"). 88 Section 1983 
provides a procedure to vindicate violation of federally protected rights, 
81. E.g. Massey. 82 F. Supp. 2d at 735 (The court denied the defendant institution's motion 
for summary judgment and found that the institution was put on notice via several complaints, 
comments, as well as a long history of suggestive pedophilia conduct by the offender, thus fulfilling 
the "deliberate indifference" requirement.). 
82. 29 F. Supp. 2d 931 (N.D. Ind. 1998). 
83. /d. at 938. 
84. /d. at 936--37. 
85. E.g. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (noting that the holding was adopted, in part, to 
accommodate Title VII's basic policies of encouraging forethought by employers). Atlirmative 
defenses are only available in cases where no tangible employment action was taken by the 
employer against the employee. !d. 
86. E.g Shante D. v. City of New York, 638 N.E.2d 962, 962 (N.Y. 1994) (The City of New 
York was found to be the legal cause of plaintiffs injury because of the school's failure to provide 
"requisite supervision."). 
87. E.g. Medlin v. Bass, 398 S.E.2d 460, 462-63 (N.C. 1990) (Employer had no way of 
knowing of defendant's pedophilic tendencies, since the person he used as a reference said nothing 
about a previous assault and the recommendations contained no information indicating that the 
defendant was a pedophile.). 
88. E.g. Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 660 ( 1978 ). 
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but creates no substantive rights. 89 It can be used in addition to, or 
instead of, Title IX to impose liability in certain circumstances. 
However, those circumstances must involve a clearly recognized, 
federally protected right. As such, the Section 1983 cases that pertain to 
Title IX issues generally involve acts of sexual assault, coerced 
intercourse, and rape, which are usually state crimes. 
Furthermore, defendants in Section 1983 actions are often protected 
by a "good faith" based ~ualified immunity if they took some action in 
response to a complaint. 9 To recover under Section 1983, the plaintiff 
must show a "custom" of deprivation of constitutional rights by showing 
a continual, widespread pattern of misconduct, or deliberate indifference 
by the institution after receipt of notice of misconduct. 91 Where there is 
not a clearly protected right (e.g., in those instances which may constitute 
hostile work environment sexual harassment), liability under Section 
1983 may be difficult to establish. 
Moreover, under the Eleventh Amendment, states have immunity 
from suit in federal court. 92 If the educational institution is a "state 
institution" (which would probably not apply to claims against private 
colleges and universities), it must either consent to the suit by waiving its 
Eleventh Amendment immunity or there must be a federal statute 
explicitly waiving the state institution's Eleventh Amendment 
immunity. 93 In this type of case, Title IX should effectively become the 
main basis for claims because Title IX conditions receipt of federal 
financial aid on the institution expressly wmvmg its Eleventh 
A d . . 94 men ment 1mmumty. 
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
90. E.g. !lagan v. Houston lndep. Sch. Dist., 5 I F.3d 4X, 51-53 (5th Cir. I 995) (Defendant's 
actions were enough to protect him from liability, though those actions were not successful, as 
"simple ineffectiveness is not enough to overcome qualified immunity."). 
91. Larson ex rei. /,arson v. Miller, 76 F.3d 1446, 1453 (8th Cir. 1996) (citing .Jane Doe A. v. 
Spec. Sch. Dist., 901 F.2d 642, 645 (8th Cir. I 990)); Colleen R. Courtade, What Constitutes Poli(v 
or Custom for Purposes of Determining Liabili(v of' Local Government Unit under 42 U.S. CA. § 
1983- Modern Cases, 81 A.L.R. Fed. 549, 558-559 (2005). 
92. The Eleventh Amendment states, "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. 
amend. XI. 
93. See e.g. Breen v. Tex. A&M U., 213 F. Supp. 2d 766, 771-72 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (citing Will 
v. Mich. Dept. of'St. Police, 491 U.S. 58,66 (1989)) (holding that because Texas had not waived its 
sovereign immunity, nor has Congress abrogated state immunity in any other provision, that an 
administrator of a student's estate was barred against federal suit against Texas A&M University due 
to the Eleventh Amendment protections). 
94. 42 U.S.C. ~ 2000d-7(a)(J); Litman v. George Mason U., 186 F.3d 544,548,550,555 (4th 
Cir. 1999); see also Klemencic v. Ohio State U., 10 F. Supp. 2d 91 I, 918 n. 7 (S.D. Ohio 1998) 
(citing Franh v. Kentucf..y Sch.fi>r the Deaf: 142 F.3d 360 (6th C:ir. I 99X)). 
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Clearly, sexual harassment is unlawful in the employment context 
under Title VII and in the educational context pursuant to Title IX which 
borrows some standards and concepts from Title VII. Protections against 
quid pro quo and hostile working environment sexual harassment are 
available and the OCR is charged with the responsibility of ensuring 
such protections are enforced. Additionally, other theories of tort liability 
(e.g., negligent retention, negligent hiring) are available as potential 
causes of action for those against whom harassment is perpetrated. 
However, sexual harassment becomes problematic in the educational 
context where protections against sexual harassment conflict with the 
concept of academic freedom. As was asked earlier, when does 
classroom conduct or discussion become sexual harassment, or at what 
point is the conduct or discussion protected under the rubric of academic 
freedom? 
IV. SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
A. Quid Pro Quo 
In cases of quid pro quo sexual harassment, there are no issues of 
academic freedom that interfere with the imposition of liability. Where 
there is a tangible academic reward or benefit in exchange for sexual 
favors, the courts have no problem holding at least the offending party 
'bl 95 responst e. 
In addition to holding the offending party responsible for actions that 
constitute sexual harassment, there are occasionally issues of vicarious 
liability on the part of the institution employing the offender. 96 One such 
example, Johnson v. Galen Health Institutes, Inc., 97 involved a student 
seeking to become a licensed practical nurse. 98 One of the student's 
instructors began what became an increasingly severe pattern of 
harassment, starting with touching, then inappropriate comments about 
her body (e.g., referencing to the student's "boobies" and "cha-chas"), 
95. E.g. Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dis/., 94 F.3d 463 (8th Cir. 1996) (Affirming the grant 
of summary judgment against the offender for creating a hostile environment-rather than quid pro 
quo sexual harassment. The employers were not held vicariously liable.). 
96. E.g. Gehser, 524 U.S. at 290. See also Alexander v. Yale U., 459 F. Supp. I, 4 (D. Conn. 
1977), affd, 631 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 1000-01 (D.C. Cir. 
1977) (MacKinnon, J., concurring)) ("inaction ... does assume significance, for on refusing to 
investigate, the institution may sensibly be held responsible for condoning or ratifying the 
employee's invidiously discriminatory conduct"); Crandell v. N.Y. College of Osteopathic Medicine, 
87 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
97. 267 F. Supp. 2d 679 (W.D. Ky. 2003). 
98. !d. at 682. 
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and eventually leading to a quid pro quo proposition - which she 
refused. 99 When the instructor gave the student a failing grade, she filed 
a complaint with the Kentucky Commission for Human Rights. 100 She 
subsequently communicated her complaints directly to the school when it 
inquired regarding her Kentucky Commission for Human Rights 
I . 101 c atm. 
Eventually, the plaintiff sued the school in United States District 
Court, alleging violations of Title IX. 102 Although the court held that a 
valid quid pro quo claim of sexual harassment was stated when the issue 
was whether the plaintiffs failure was a direct result of her refusal of the 
instructor's proposition, it granted the motion for summary judgment on 
the quid pro quo claim because the school did not have sufficient 
notice. 103 Indeed, the plaintiff went to all her classes and made no 
complaints to the school prior to the end of class. 104 And, the court also 
granted the motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs hostile 
. l . 105 
env1ronment c atm. 
Another example of potential vicarious liability for an institution that 
employs an offender can be found in Gyda v. Temple University. 106 The 
Gyda court held that the plaintiff alleged a viable quid pro quo claim 
when he and his supervising professor mutually terminated a romantic 
relationship. 107 The supervising professor subsequentP' adopted a 
hostile, rude, and harassing manner toward the student. 10 The plaintiff 
raised the issue that the supervising professor had made his life more 
difficult in the laboratory. Noting Title VII precedent where quid pro quo 
liability had been imposed merely when the work life became "more 
difficult," the court held a valid quid pro quo claim under Title IX had 
been made, and the school had potential liability under such a claim. 109 
B. Hostile Environment 
Like quid pro quo claims, hostile environment sexual harassment 
9'1. !d. 
100. !d. at 683. 
101. !d. 
I 02. !d. at 681. 
I 03. !d. at 689. 
I 04. !d. at 687. 
105. !d. 
106. 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7099 (E.D. Pa. May 23, 2000). 
107. !d. at *5. 
I 08. !d. at** 5, 17, 19-20. 
109. !d. at *20 (citing Walker v. Mac(rugals Bargains. Closeouts, Inc., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
18136 (E.D. La. Dec. 9, 1'194)). 
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claims often do not involve issues of academic freedom. Hostile 
environment sexual harassment occurs when unwelcome sexual 
advances, requests for sexual favors, or other verbal or physical conduct 
have the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an 
individual's P.erformance or create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive 
. 110 
environment. 
A rather egregious example of a hostile environment claim in which 
a plaintiff attempted to attach liability to the employer of the offender is 
Wills v. Brown University. 111 Wills was a student who went to talk to 
one of her professors about difficulties she was having with class 
materials. 112 During the discussion with her professor, the two prayed, 
and the professor pulled the student onto his lap twice and fondled 
her. 113 During the course of the university's investigation the professor 
admitted to most of the allegations made by the student. 114 The plaintiff 
filed a written complaint with the associate dean and her complaint was 
investigated. 115 As a result, the professor was placed on probation and a 
written reprimand was issued cautioning him to avoid any such actions in 
the future. 116 The associate dean deemed these disciplinary actions 
appropriate because he believed that this was the professor's first 
offense. 117 As it turned out, not only was this not the professor's first 
such offense, but it was not his last offense, either. He was terminated 
two years later for harassing other female students. 118 
The plaintiffs suit named both Brown University and the professor, 
and sought recovery under Title IX for hostile environment sex 
harassment and quid pro quo sex harassment. 119 Plaintiff also alleged a 
number of tort-based claims: assault and battery; negligent hiring, 
supervision, and retention, and entrustment; and intentional and negligent 
infliction of emotional distress. 120 An additional claim was stated under 
r d' . . . 121 state statute tOr sex tscnmmatwn. 
A default judgment was entered against the professor in the amount 
110. Kinman, 94 F.3d at 467 (citing Cram v. Lamson & Sessions Co., 49 F.3d 466, 474 (8th 
Cir. 1995)). 
I II. 184 F.3d 20, 23-24 (I st Cir. 1999). 
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of $275,000. 122 Brown University's motion for summary judgment was 
granted as to the claims of negligent hiringf retention, and intentional and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress. 23 And at trial, at the end of 
plaintiffs case, the court granted Brown University's motion for directed 
verdict as to the quid pro quo and assault and battery claims, allowing 
only the negligent supervision and hostile environment claims to go to 
the jury. 124 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Brown University on 
b h I . 125 ot c mms. 
The appellate court ultimately affirmed the trial court's judgment in 
all respects. 126 With respect to the Title IX claims, the court found little 
credible evidence that the Universi~ had any notice of improper conduct 
prior to the plaintiffs complaint. 1 7 And once the University received 
the plaintiffs complaint, an investigation and remedial measures 
followed, thereby overcoming the "deliberate indifference" standard. 128 
Another example where a hostile environment claim was made 
against both the offender and his employer is the case of Frederick v. 
Simpson College. 129 In Frederick, the plaintiff was a Russian immigrant 
enrolled in school to obtain a teaching certificate. 130 One of the 
plaintiffs professors, Steven Rose, allegedly created a hostile 
environment by use of vulgar language, general comments concerning 
sexual activity, and staring at the plaintiff, among other things. 131 After 
the final in-class meeting, the plaintiff was invited by Rose to call him at 
any time if she needed anything. 132 Subsequent to the class ending, the 
plaintiff and Rose had several conversations, some initiated by the 
plaintiff, and they even met off of school premises. 133 
Even though the plaintiff and Rose maintained a relationship long 
after the class had ended, with Rose writing a number of reference letters 
at the plaintiffs request and the plaintiff giving Rose a book and a letter 
as gifts, the court found that such activities were insufficient to give the 
administrators actual notice. 134 Further, the court dismissed the 
122. /d. 
123. !d. at 25. 
124. !d. 
125. !d. 
126. !d. at 27. 
127. /d. at 26-27. 
12g. /d. at 27. 
129. 149 F. Supp. 2d 826 (S.D. Iowa 200 I). 
130. !d. at 828. 
131. !d. at 829-30. 
132. !d. at 830-31. 
133. !d. at 830-32. 
134. !d. at 838-39. 
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plaintiffs Title IX claim against the college because the college had 
undertaken an investigation of the allegations. 135 Indeed, the court found 
that, although the investigation may not have been very thorough, it was 
enough to disprove the deliberate indifference standard mandated by 
Gebser. 136 
Yet another attempt to attach liability to both the offender and his 
employer is Zimmer v. Ashland University. 137 In Zimmer, the plaintiff 
was a student on the Ashland University swim team who alleged that her 
swim coach repeatedly made sexual comments to her. The swim coach 
told her "that she looked good in a blue bathing suit on different 
occasions" and performed massages on her despite her request that the 
college's athletic trainer treat her ailments. 138 The student and other 
members of the women's swim team met with the athletic director to 
complain about the coach, with the result that the athletic director 
informed the coach that his actions were unacceptable. 139 
Even after the meeting with the athletic director, the plaintiff alleged 
that the coach made at least three more inappropriate comments to 
her. 140 The plaintiff then transferred to another university because she 
did not want to be on the swim team with that particular coach. 141 Even 
though the court noted that the plaintiffs claim of a hostile educational 
environment was not as severe as in other instances, the court still held 
that the evidence of the inappropriate conduct, given that the plaintiff 
transferred to another college in order to avoid experiencing any further 
inappropriate conduct, was sufficient to state a hostile environment claim 
. . I . fT. I IX 142 m v10 atwn o It e . 
The court further held that because the plaintiff had complained to 
the athletic director who had authority to remedy the situation, but who 
failed to do more than issue a vague reprimand, the university's motion 
for summary judgment based on Gebser was denied. 143 The plaintiffs 
tort-based claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress were 
dismissed against the university and athletic director, but were 
maintained as to the coach. 144 The plaintiffs tort-based claims against 
135. !d. at 840. 
136. !d. at 840. 
137. 200 I U. S. Dist. LEX IS 15075 (N. D. Ohio Sept. 5, 200 I). 
138. /d. at **5-6. 
139. !d. at **7-X. 
140. !d. at *8. 
141. /d.at**89. 
142. !d. at **25 32. 
143. /d. at ** 18 19. 21 25. 32. 
144. !d. at **35, 37. 
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the university for negligent hiring were similarly dismissed, but a tort 
claim of negligent retention was allowed to proceed. 145 
C. Classroom Academic Activities 
In considering the above cases, it is important to keep in mind that 
they all involved rather egregious violations. In an employment context, 
there would be little dispute about whether sexual harassment occurred, 
in contrast to the academic setting, where there may not be a basis for 
such a position. Because of the rather clear factual circumstances, there 
are generally no issues of academic freedom to consider. However, 
academic freedom does become a central issue where the factual 
circumstances concerning the alleged sexual harassment are based solely 
on conduct that occurs in, and is germane to, classroom academic 
activities. 
One example in which academic freedom was at the center of the of 
the factual circumstances of the alleged sexual harassment is Cohen v. 
San Bernardino Valley College. 146 The plaintiff Cohen was a tenured 
professor at the College, who had taught English and film studies since 
1968. 147 Over the years, Cohen had assigned provocative essays to his 
students and also played "devil's advocate" during class discussions. 148 
In the spring of 1992, Cohen stated in class that he wrote for Hustler and 
Playboy magazines and read some articles aloud. 149 Cohen then assigned 
the class to write essays defining pornography. 150 One of his students 
was offended by the language used in class and by Cohen's repeated 
focus on topics of a sexual nature. 151 The student asked for an alternative 
assignment to the "define pornography" paper, but Cohen refused. 152 
The student stop~ed attending Cohen's class and received a failing grade 
for the semester. 53 She then filed a complaint about Cohen's statements 
and conduct to the chair of the department, asserting that Cohen had 
!54 
sexually harassed her. 
After an administrative hearing, the College's grievance committee 
found that Cohen had violated the College's policy against sexual 
145. !d. at *41. 
146. 92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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harassment. 155 Ultimately, Cohen was found guilty of creating a hostile 
I . . . h 1 156 c h . d earnmg environment m t e c assroom. o en was reqmre to 
provide a syllabus concerning his teaching style, purpose, course content, 
and methods; attend a sexual harassment seminar within ninety days; 
undergo a formal evaluation procedure in accordance with the collective 
bargaining agreement; become sensitive to particular needs and 
backgrounds of his students; and modify his teaching strategy when it 
became apparent that his techniques created a climate which impeded the 
students' ability to learn. 157 
Cohen was also advised that additional violation of the sexual 
harassment policy could result in further disciplinary measures, including 
suspension or termination. 158 Cohen sued the College under Section 
1983, claiming that the Colle~e's actions violated his First Amendment 
rights to academic freedom. 15 The District Court decided Cohen's claim 
on the basis that the college's sexual harassment policy was 
unconstitutionally vague. 160 In particular, the court noted that until the 
student complained, Cohen's teaching style had apparently been 
considered pedagogically sound and within the bounds of teaching 
methodology permitted at the College. 161 Since Cohen's teaching style 
went unchallenged for years, the court held that it was unconstitutional to 
punish him on the basis of a policy that did not clearly advise him what 
162 
was and was not acceptable. 
Remanding the case back to the district court, the Ninth Circuit held 
that the district court should order the college to remove the disciplinary 
decision from Cohen's personnel file and enjoin the College from further 
implementing any discipline based upon the vague harassment policy. 163 
But, it further noted that the individual defendants were protected by the 
qualified immunity under Section 1983 because they acted upon a 
reasonable, good faith belief that their actions in disciplining Cohen were 
consistent with the law. 164 Even though Cohen's academic freedom 
claim was vindicated, he received no damages from the courts-a hollow 
victory, at best. 




159. !d. at 969. 
160. !d. at 971-72. 
161 !d. at 972. 
162. !d. 
163. !d. 
164. !d. at 973. 
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While not involving a sexual harassment claim, another case 
provides an important example of how an instructor's academic freedom 
may be recognized with no remedy for the disregard of such freedoms. In 
Dube v. State University of New York, 165 the court upheld a professor's 
academic freedom to teach that Zionism was a form of racism in a class 
called "The Politics of Race." 166 The class addressed three 
manifestations of racism: Nazism in Germany, Apartheid in South 
Africa, and Zionism in Israel. 167 A complaint about the contents of the 
course was filed by a visiting professor from Israel who wrote a letter to 
the dean of the college, objecting to Zionism being characterized as 
racism. 168 An investigation was undertaken by the executive committee 
of the University Senate, which unanimously determined that the 
plaintiffs teachings were within the bounds of academic freedom. 169 
Nevertheless, substantial public furor grew over the contents of the 
class. 170 The plaintiff became eligible for tenure during the 1983-84 
academic year, and the peer committee voted six to one in favor of 
recommending tenure, and voted four to three in recommending 
promotion to associate professor. 171 However, the dean of the College of 
Humanities and Fine Arts recommended that the plaintiff be denied 
tenure and promotion based upon the plaintiffs alleged failure to provide 
the quantity and quality of written scholarship required by the college; 
h . . ' "d d 172 t e umvers1ty s pres1 ent concurre . 
The plaintiff filed suit under Section 1983, seeking compensatory 
and punitive damages against the individual defendants and the 
University, as well as a permanent injunction that would require the 
defendants to appoint him to a tenured position. 173 The plaintiffs 
complaint alleged that the College's denial of tenure "based on his 
discussion of controversial topics" violated his First Amendment 
academic freedoms guaranteed in his contract, and the tenure review 
process denied him of his due process rights. 174 
The court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment on 
Dube's First Amendment claim, holding that the College's actions in 
165. 900 F.2d 587 (2d Cir. 1990). 
166. !d. at 589. 
167. !d. 
168 !d. 
169. !d. at 590. 
170. !d. 
171. !d. Dube requested and was granted a postponement until 1984 85. !d. 
172. !d. at 591. 
173. !d. at 592. 
174. !d. at 58'!. 
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denying tenure to the plaintiff were objectively unreasonable and 
violated the plaintiffs First Amendment academic freedoms. 175 With 
regard to qualified immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, the court 
ruled that it was not available to the defendants because qualified 
immunity does not shield government officials, acting in their individual 
capacities, whose conduct violates plaintiffs constitutional rights. 176 
Thus, the court recognized the validity of the plaintiffs academic 
freedom claims, even in the face of qualified immunity. 
As an example of a hostile environment sexual harassment claim, the 
plaintiff in Silva v. University of New Hampshire 177 used a sexual 
analogy to describe the concept of "focus" in writing as part of a 
freshman English class on technical writing. 178 The plaintiffs statement 
was: 
I will put focus in terms of sex, so you can better understand it. Focus 
is like sex. You seek a target. You zero in on your subject. You move 
from side to side. You close in on the subject. You bracket the subject 
and center on it. Focus connects experience and language. You and the 
b. b 179 su Ject ecome one. 
Two days later, during the second technical writing class, the 
plaintiff used a belly dancer's definition of belly dancing to illustrate 
how a good definition combined a general classification with concrete 
specifics in a metaphor. 180 The plaintiff had used both examples in his 
classes on numerous occasions and the belly dancing simile for at least 
two decades. 181 
Six students from the class met with an associate professor 
subsequent to the technical writing class, and complained of sexual 
harassment. 182 The University investigated and determined that the 
plaintiffs comments violated its sexual harassment policr As a result, 
the plaintiff was suspended without pay for one year. 18· The plaintiff 
filed suit against the university under Section 1983 and under various 
I I . 184 state aw c atms. 
The district court granted the professor's motion for a preliminary 
175. !d. at 594-98, 600. 
176. !d. (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,818 (1982)). 
177. 888 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.H 1994). 
17S. !d. at 298-99. 
179. !d. at 299. 
I SO. !d. 
181. !d. 
182. !d. at 300. 
183. !d. at 31 I. 
184. !d. at 297. 
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. . . 185 h I . h . . ' . 186 Th I mJunctJon, a tmg t e umvers1ty s suspensiOn. e court a so 
found that the professor had a protected liberty interest in his 
employment 187 because the plaintiff's comments were not of a sexual 
nature, but in fact, were legitimately related to the pedagogical concern 
of explaining the topic at hand in a fashion the plaintiff believed the 
students could comprehend. 188 The determinative factor in this case was 
the intent and use of the allegedly offensive language. The plaintiff had 
specifically chosen an analogy which he believed the students could 
relate to and which was directly related to his legitimate pedagogical 
f I . . I 189 concern o exp ammg a c assroom concept. 
Another example involving a claim of hostile environment sexual 
harassment can be found in Gretzinger v. University of Hawaii 
Professional Assembly. 190 In Gretzinger, the plaintiff was a ~tudent of 
Professor Lamb and claimed hostile environment sexual harassment 
during the course of a classroom discussion of rape and sexual 
191 harassment. The student further alleged that Lamb sexually assaulted 
her (although no specifics were ever identified) on several occasions. 192 
When the student complained to the University, an investigation ensued, 
resulting in the dismissal of her charges. 193 
The student subsequently filed suit, claiming violations of Title IX, 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1983 
violations, and a tort-based claim of intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. 194 Prior to trial, the university settled, but the suit proceeded 
against Lamb. 195 The trial court dismissed all of the plaintiff's federal 
claims, noting that the plaintiff had made an allegation under Title IX of 
I. . d h d d 1' . 196 reta 1atwn an a prove no reta mtJon. 
Similarly, the court dismissed the plaintiff's Section 1983 claim on 
the plaintiff's admission (as she was acting pro se) that such claim was 
185. !d. at 326-27. 
I 86. !d. at 332. 
187. !d. at 317-18. 
18K /d.at312-13,316. 
189. The court granted summary judgment to the university on the plaintiff's procedural due 
process claims that challenged the adequacy of the "informal" sexual harassment procedures, id. at 
321, and to several individual defendants on the plaintiff's breach of contract claims as the 
individual defendants were not party to the contract (collective bargaining agreement) in question. 
!d. at 329. 
190. 1998 U.S. App. LEX IS 15370 (9th Cir. July 7, !998). 




195. !d. at *3. 
196. !d. at *7. 
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based on the Title IX retaliation claim and, since the plaintiff had not 
proved Title IX retaliation, dismissal of the Section 1983 claim was also 
appropriate. 197 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court's 
dismissal of the plaintiffs claims and further agreed "that detailed 
instructions on the law of sexual harassment would have merely 
confused the jury as to the elements of an emotional distress claim." 198 
Of some interest is the fact that Professor Lamb also filed suit 
against the University of Hawaii, alleging a violation of his First 
Amendment rights based upon the University's investigation of the 
sexual harassment allegation, but was unsuccessful. 199 The Ninth Circuit 
held that the University was immune from suit under the Eleventh 
Amendment and further held that the individual defendants had a 
qualified immunity which precluded the imposition of liability under 
Section 1983, based upon the fact that they had a duty to investigate the 
sexual harassment claim, and the courts had yet to define what the 
professor's First Amendment rights were under the circumstances. 200 
Another notable holding discussing the sitftnificance of hostile 
environment sexual harassment is Vega v. Miller. 2 In Vega, a professor 
was reprimanded as a result of an exercise demonstrating the concept of 
"clustering" during a composition class. 202 Clustering is a form of 
brainstormin§: exercise where the topic to be discussed is written on a 
blackboard. 2 3 Various terms offered by class members are also recorded 
on the blackboard and "clustered" into groups so that students might 
appropriately write on the topic in such a way as to avoid redundant 
204 terms or concepts. 
The exercise at issue occurred during the last ten minutes of the 
plaintiffs class. 205 The subject suggested by the students was "sex," 
which Professor Vega understood to be "sex and relationships."206 As 
the students began to call out words and terms relevant to the subject, 
207 
some of them began to use crude and vulgar language. Vega 
197. !d. at **8~9. 
198. !d. at *8. 
199. Lamh v. U. of Haw., 1998 U.S. App. LEX IS I 0775 at **2, 6~7 (9th Cir. May 28, 1998). 
200. !d. at **2-3, 5-7. 
201. 273 F.3d 460 (2d Cir. 2001). 
202. !d. at 462-63. 
203. !d. (Plaintiff carried out a "free-association exercise called 'clustering,' in which students 
were invited to select a topic [which was written on the black board], then call out words related to 
the topic, and finally group related words together into 'clusters.'"). 
204. !d. 
205. /d.at476,480. 
206. !d. at 463. 
207. !d. 
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cautioned his students that the use of some of the terminology they were 
suggesting was not appropriate for most people and should be used rarely 
or not at all. 208 
Interestingly enough, none of the students or their parents ever 
complained about the exercise; instead the issue came to the attention of 
the college administrators when th~ were investigating a complaint of a 
student on an unrelated matter. 2 When the college administrators 
became aware of Vega's exercise, a meeting was arranged between the 
plaintiff and the vice president of academic affairs. 210 
The plaintiff handed over copies of his lesson plans and his notes on 
the exercise that included many of the provocative topics and terms that 
had been shouted out by the students during the course of the 
exercise. 211 The plaintiff was terminated for his "reliance on sex as a 
theme and his use of sexually-explicit vocabulary."212 
The plaintiff filed suit in U.S. District Court, alleging a Section 1983 
violation based upon infringement of his First Amendment rights of 
academic freedom. 213 The trial court denied the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity and the 
College administrators appealed. 214 While the Second Circuit reversed 
the trial court's decision and remanded the case with specific instructions 
that the case be dismissed on the basis of qualified immunity, the court 
specifically noted that the plaintiff had been disciplined for permitting a 
classroom exercise initiated for legitimate pedagogical purposes. 215 
However, in light of the unclear nature of the scope of academic 
freedom at the time of the College's actions, the court held that qualified 
immunity did attach in each of the cases as the administrators were 
acting within what they believed were legal parameters then in 
existence. 216 Thus, even if Professor Vega's First Amendment rights 
were violated, as the classroom exercise was initiated for a legitimate 
pedagogical purpose, 217 he still had no recourse against the College. 218 




212. !d. at 463-64. 
213. /d.at464. 
214. !d. at 464-65 (referring to those appellant defendants only). 
215. !d. at467. 471. 
216. !d. at 468-71. 
217. !d. at471 n. 13. 
218. See also Bonnell, 241 F.3d at R02-03 (wherein a college professor was denied injunctive 
relief from disciplinary action for routinely sprinkling profanity into classroom discussions as part of 
his normal conversation). 
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As all of these cases illustrate, even in the name of academic 
freedom, educators must proceed with caution when utilizing 
controversial subjects, such as sex, as teaching tools in the classroom. 
Indeed, these cases demonstrate the tension between the protections 
against sexual discrimination and harassment and the principles of 
academic freedom. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Definitions and applications of both concepts of academic freedom 
and sexual harassment have evolved significantly in recent decades and, 
no doubt, will continue to transform even further. What is abundantly 
clear is that the protections of academic freedom come into conflict with 
protections granted to students under Title IX against sexual 
discrimination and harassment. Indeed, as the court in Bonnell recited: 
Since the precise frontier between academic freedom and sexual 
harassment remains to be defined by the courts case by case, a 
teacher ... may be able to find safety and comfort under the [First] 
Amendment only if the words uttered are found in appropriate textual 
materials and the utterances are pertinent to discussion of those 
materials. Beyond this point, the te~y~er enters uncharted territory and 
proceeds at his or her own risk .... 
Obviously, cases of quid pro quo sexual harassment are unlawful, as 
are those cases of hostile environment sexual harassment that involve 
egregious facts, such as touching, groping, and other offensive activities 
which occur outside the classroom. 
When the sexual harassment complaint is based upon in-class 
activities, an inevitable collision occurs between academic freedoms and 
sexual harassment protections. Based upon review of the case law, it 
would appear that where any sexually oriented discussion is specifically 
and legitimately related to a valid pedagogical end, the academic 
freedom claims must prevail. It is when no legitimate pedagogical end is 
involved that the sexual harassment protections will prevail. 
It should also be apparent that individual professors may find 
enforcement of their academic freedoms problematic as, for the most 
part, their claims will be based upon Section 1983, which recognizes a 
qualified immunity for the actions of university or college administrators 
when they are acting in good faith, based upon their understanding and 
application of the law. In addition, where administrative personnel seek 
219. !d. at 804 (citing a memorandum by Defendant written March 4, 1998, issuing a warning 
to Plaintitl). 
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to enforce sexual harassment policies, there is the added concern of 
vagueness, which may make the policy indefensible under the First 
Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment due process considerations. 
Thus, while sex may be a central part of human existence and an 
appropriate subject for academic discussion and learning, and given the 
recent case law, educators should act cautiously and proceed at their own 
risk when exploring the line between academic freedom and sexual 
discrimination and harassment. 
